United States v. Marin Castaneda by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-22-1998 
United States v. Marin Castaneda 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"United States v. Marin Castaneda" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 21. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/21 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed January 22, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-5252 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
GABRIEL JESUS MARIN-CASTANEDA, 
 
Gabriel Jesus Marin Castaneda, 
 
       Appellant. 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
(D.C. Criminal No. 97-cr-00039) 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 
November 21, 1997 
 
BEFORE: SCIRICA and LEWIS, Circuit Judges, 
and POLLAK,* District Judge. 
 
(Filed January 22, 1998) 
 
       Tonianne J. Bongiovanni 
 
       Office of Federal Public Defender 
       972 Broad Street 
       Newark, NJ 07102 
 
        Attorney for Appellant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
 
  
       Kevin McNulty 
       Office of United States Attorney 
       970 Broad Street 
       Room 502 
       Newark, NJ 07102 
 
        Attorney for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Gabriel Jesus Marin-Castaneda, a Colombian national, 
appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to 
importing 1,227 grams of heroin into the United States 
from Colombia. Marin-Castaneda argues that the district 
court erred when it decided that it did not have the 
authority to depart from the applicable sentencing range 
based on the following factors: (1) Marin-Castaneda's 
willingness not to oppose deportation; (2) his age; and (3) 
the deterrent effect of being hospitalized as a result of 
attempting to smuggle heroin in his stomach. Wefind no 
error committed by the district court. Therefore we will 
affirm the district court's judgment of sentence. 
 
I. 
 
In October 1996, Marin-Castaneda arrived at Newark 
International Airport aboard a flight from Colombia. During 
a customs examination, customs officials found a white 
powdery substance in Marin-Castaneda's shoes whichfield- 
tested positive for heroin. After the officials arrested him, 
Marin-Castaneda informed them that he had also ingested 
pellets of heroin. The agents then transported him to the 
Bayonne Medical Center. He remained in the hospital for 
eleven days, during which time he passed ninety pellets. 
 
Marin-Castaneda pleaded guilty to importing 
approximately 1,227 grams of heroin into the United 
States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 952(a) and 960(a)(1), 
(b)(1). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the base offense 
level was reduced from 32 to 27. The district court granted 
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an additional two-point downward adjustment, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3B1.2(b), because Marin-Castaneda was a minor 
participant in a larger smuggling scheme. Marin-Castaneda 
moved for a further two-point reduction, under U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.0, based on his willingness to consent to deportation, 
his age and the deterrent effect of his hospitalization due to 
ingestion of the pellets. The district court denied this 
motion. As a result, the total offense level of 25 and Marin- 
Castaneda's criminal history category of I yielded a 
sentencing guideline range of 57 to 71 months. The district 
court sentenced him to a prison term of 57 months, a 
supervised release term of 5 years and a special 
assessment of $100. Marin-Castaneda was 67 years old at 
the time of sentencing. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. Generally, we lack jurisdiction "to review a refusal 
to depart downward `when the district court, knowing it 
may do so, nonetheless determines that departure is not 
warranted.' " United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 
(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2413 
(1997)). We do have jurisdiction, however, when a district 
court refuses to depart downward because it believes it 
lacks the authority to do so. United States v. Evans, 49 
F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1995). In this case, the district court 
ruled that it had no authority to grant Marin-Castaneda's 
motion, so we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742 and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
We review the question of whether a district court had 
authority to depart downward under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Sally, 116 F.3d at 78. However, a district court's 
determination of the scope of its authority is based entirely 
in law. For this reason, "[l]ittle turns . . . on whether we 
label review of this particular question abuse of discretion 
or de novo." Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047 
(1996) (citation omitted). "A district court by definition 
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
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III. 
 
Marin-Castaneda argues that the district court had the 
authority to depart downward based on his willingness to 
consent to deportation,1 his age and the ordeal caused by 
ingestion of the heroin pellets. We will address each of 
these factors in turn. 
 
A. 
 
Initially, we must observe that Marin-Castaneda does not 
make any claim that his very status as a deportable alien 
provided a basis for downward departure. Other courts of 
appeal have expressed conflicting opinions as to whether a 
district court can depart downward based on an alien's 
eligibility for deportation. Compare United States v. Farouil, 
124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a district 
court may depart if it finds that status as a deportable alien 
results in an "unusual or exceptional hardship in. . . 
conditions of confinement"), and United States v. Smith, 27 
F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[I]f a deportable alien is 
assigned to a more drastic prison than otherwise solely 
because his escape would have the extra consequence of 
defeating his deportation, then the defendant's status as a 
deportable alien would have clearly generated increased 
severity and thus might be the proper subject of a 
departure."), with United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 
645-47 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that status as a 
deportable alien is not an appropriate ground for downward 
departure). However, we need not address this issue 
because Marin-Castaneda does not argue that his 
deportability exacerbates his sentence in any way. Rather, 
he claims that the district court should have considered his 
decision not to contest deportation as a basis for departure. 
He supports this claim by noting that: (1) the Attorney 
General has authorized federal prosecutors to recommend 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We recognize that Congress has recently acted to replace the term 
"deportation" with "removal." See Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, S 308, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009- 
620, 3009-621. However, since the term "deportation" appears in most 
of the relevant case law, we will use that term in this opinion to avoid 
any potential confusion. 
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downward departures for aliens who accept deportation 
without resistance; and (2) the Attorney General has the 
power to deport a convicted alien before completion of a 
prison term. We do not find that either of these points 
permits a district court to depart downward when an alien 
concedes deportation. 
 
In 1995, the Attorney General issued a memorandum to 
all federal prosecutors stating a policy favoring the 
"deportation of criminal aliens from the United States as 
expeditiously as possible." Appendix at 28 (Memorandum 
from Office of the Attorney General, April 28, 1995). In 
furtherance of this objective, the Attorney General 
explained that "prosecutors may agree to recommend a one 
or two level downward departure from the applicable 
guideline sentencing range in return for the alien's 
concession of deportability and agreement to accept a final 
order of deportation." Id. at 29. Such departures would be 
made pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0. See also 18 U.S.C. 
S 3553(b) (stating that sentencing court may impose 
sentence outside applicable guideline range if "there exists 
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to 
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission . . ."). Marin-Castaneda contends 
that, since the prosecution had the authority to recommend 
downward departure based on his willingness to be 
deported, the district court erred in ruling that it could not 
grant the two-point adjustment. 
 
This argument misses a fundamental point. The 
prosecution did not recommend downward departure on 
this basis, but opposed it. The United States Attorney for 
the District of New Jersey did not have to accept Marin- 
Castaneda's offer to waive his right to a deportation 
hearing, and chose to reject it. Since Marin-Castaneda is 
not a resident alien, but a Colombian national who, for all 
that appears, set foot on United States soil for the sole 
purpose of importing heroin, it seems unlikely that he 
would have had any remotely colorable basis for opposing 
deportation. At all events, Marin-Castaneda did not at 
sentencing (and has not here) put forth an arguable 
objection to deportation that he was willing to waive in 
exchange for a downward departure. Thus, his waiver of his 
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right to a deportation hearing provides no real 
administrative advantage. Although we have never 
addressed this precise issue, we receive guidance from 
other courts of appeal. In United States v. Clase-Espinal, 
115 F.3d 1054, 1055 (1st Cir. 1997), a district court 
refused to depart downward in sentencing a defendant from 
the Dominican Republic, even though he consented to 
deportation, because he had no plausible basis to contest 
deportation. In affirming the district court, the court of 
appeals for the First Circuit noted that section 5K2.0 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines permits a downward departure only 
when "the proffered ground makes the case sufficiently 
atypical to remove it from the `heartland.' " Id. at 1057 
(quoting Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045). With this requirement 
in mind, the Clase-Espinal court reasoned that "an alien 
criminal defendant with no plausible basis for contesting 
deportation . . . does not meet the atypicality requirement 
for a section 5K2.0 departure simply by relying upon 
whatever administrative convenience presumably may 
result from a stipulated deportation." 115 F.3d at 1058 
(citation omitted). The court based this conclusion on the 
fact that "only about 3% of all apprehended aliens who are 
expelled ever undergo a deportation hearing." Id. at 1058 
n.4 (citing Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1993 
Statistical Yearbook 158 tbl. 59 (1994)). 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Flores-Uribe, 106 F.3d 1485, 
1486 (9th Cir. 1997), a district court denied a defendant's 
request for a downward departure based on his consent to 
deportation to Mexico. The district court determined that it 
had neither the authority to depart downward nor to issue 
a deportation order absent a request from the United States 
Attorney. Id. at 1486. The court of appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court by holding that (1) under 
8 U.S.C. S 1252a(d)(1),2 a district court can only order 
deportation, as an exception to the Executive Branch's 
plenary power to deport aliens, at the request of the United 
States Attorney and (2) absent such a request, the 
defendant's stipulation to deportation had "no practical or 
legal effect since the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter a deportation order." Id. at 1487-88. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This provision has since been redesignated as 8 U.S.C. S 1252a(c)(1). 
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We find the reasoning of Clase-Espinal and Flores-Uribe 
compelling with respect to two points: (1) a defendant 
without a nonfrivolous defense to deportation presents no 
basis for downward departure under section 5K2.0 by 
simply consenting to deportation and (2) in light of the 
judiciary's limited power with regard to deportation, a 
district court cannot depart downward on this basis 
without a request from the United States Attorney. Thus, 
we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing 
to depart downward. Such departure was beyond its 
authority. We note that, even if the prosecution had 
requested downward departure on this basis, the district 
court still would have had the discretion not to depart 
downward. See United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 429 
(3d Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is the district court's decision, not the 
prosecutor's, whether to depart and to what extent."); 
Clase-Espinal, 115 F.3d at 1056 (affirming district court's 
decision not to depart despite fact that United States 
Attorney recommended two-level downward departure 
based on defendant's consent to deportation). The United 
States Attorney's opposition only militates against 
downward departure in this case. The recommendation of 
the United States Attorney, while it may not be sufficient to 
convince a district court to depart downward on this basis, 
is at least necessary for such a decision. 
 
Marin-Castaneda makes the supplemental argument that 
the district court had authority to depart downward 
because the Attorney General may deport an alien before 
completion of a prison term. The Attorney General has 
authority to 
 
       remove an alien . . . before the alien has completed a 
       sentence of imprisonment . . . if the Attorney General 
       determines that (I) the alien is confined pursuant to a 
       final conviction for a nonviolent offense . . . and (II) the 
       removal of the alien is appropriate and in the best 
       interest of the United States. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1231(a)(4)(B).3 Marin-Castaneda's reliance on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Both parties use the citation "8 U.S.C.S 1252(h)(2)(A)" but this 
provision is presently codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1231(a)(4)(B). See Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, SS 305-06, 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009-598, 3009-599, 3009-607 (transposing 
language from 8 U.S.C. S 1252 to 8 U.S.C. S 1231). 
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this provision is misplaced for two reasons. First, the 
provision only offers a post-sentence method by which an 
alien may be deported before fully serving a term of 
imprisonment. The provision makes no mention of 
downward departure in imposing the sentence itself. 
Second, the statute vests the Attorney General, not the 
district court, with the authority to curtail a prison 
sentence for the purpose of deportation. As discussed 
earlier, a district court cannot sua sponte issue a 
deportation order without a request from the United States 
Attorney. 8 U.S.C. S 1252a(c)(1). Thus, the district court 
could not depart downward pursuant to section 
1231(a)(4)(B) because the statute does nothing to expand 
its rather limited powers on issues of deportation. In sum, 
Marin-Castaneda invokes section 1231(a)(4)(B) at the wrong 
juncture and directs his argument at the wrong branch of 
government. In fact, Marin-Castaneda does not even have 
standing to enforce this statute. See Thye v. United States, 
109 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Attorney 
General's authority to deport "creates no private right of 
action" for a criminal alien because Attorney General must 
act in best interest of United States, not the criminal alien). 
The Attorney General may still exercise her power to deport 
Marin-Castaneda before he has completed his sentence, but 
this possibility created no ground for downward departure 
by the district court when it was imposing the sentence. 
Consequently, the district court did not err in concluding 
that it could not depart downward pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
S 1231(a)(4)(B). 
 
B. 
 
Marin-Castaneda argues that his age and the ordeal of 
being hospitalized also served as bases for downward 
departure. We disagree. First, the Sentencing Commission 
has instructed that 
 
       [a]ge . . . is not ordinarily relevant in determining 
       whether a sentence should be outside the applicable 
       guideline range. Age may be a reason to impose a 
       sentence below the applicable guideline range when the 
       defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of 
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       punishment such as home confinement might be 
       equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5H1.1, policy statement. We have interpreted 
this language as "foreclos[ing] departures based on age in 
all but the most extraordinary cases." Sally, 116 F.3d at 78; 
see also United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 798 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (concluding that defendant's age of 57 offered no 
basis for downward departure). Marin-Castaneda does not 
assert any extraordinary condition other than the fact that 
he was 67 years old at the time of sentencing. He does not 
seem to suffer from any unusual impairments for a man his 
age; certainly nothing suggesting that home confinement 
would be as effective as incarceration. In fact, he had never 
been hospitalized before his stay at the Bayonne Medical 
Center. Appendix at 98 (referring to Presentence 
Investigation Report P 37). Absent some extraordinary 
infirmity, we cannot conclude that the bare fact that Marin- 
Castaneda was 67 years old would have justified a 
downward departure by the district court. See United States 
v. Goff, 20 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
section 5H1.1 does not permit downward departure for 67- 
year-old defendant in good health); United States v. Tucker, 
986 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 
Second, with regard to the deterrent effect of Marin- 
Castaneda's physical ordeal, he has indicated that he was 
aware of the health risks involved in ingesting heroin prior 
to his trip. Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report 
at 14. Thus, the manifest danger in swallowing ninety 
pellets of heroin did not deter Marin-Castaneda from 
embarking on this endeavor in the first place. Furthermore, 
the physical trauma he experienced, which is inherent in 
smuggling drugs in this manner, could hardly be 
considered an unusual characteristic or circumstance 
distinguishing this case "from the `heartland' cases covered 
by the guidelines." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0, policy statement; see 
also Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046 ("Before a departure is 
permitted, certain aspects of the case must be found 
unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases 
. . . ."). In sum, neither Marin-Castaneda's age nor his 
physical ordeal presented grounds for a downward 
departure. 
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IV. 
 
Before the district court, Marin-Castaneda argued that 
the three proposed bases for downward departure -- 
consent to deportation, age and physical trauma -- warrant 
downward departure collectively, even if they may not 
individually. We find the three bases to be no more 
compelling collectively than they are individually. Viewed 
together or separately, these factors do not justify 
downward departure. 
 
Since the district court did not err in determining the 
scope of its authority to depart downward, we will affirm its 
judgment of sentence. 
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